The attack was set for 25th September but on the afternoon of 24th September the wind was from the East. This would have posed problems. However, by midnight the wind had switched to the Southwest and the decision was taken to go ahead! The troops had all been brought forward in the trenches when the wind appeared to die, but it was too late to change their orders!
Gas was released at 0550 and six divisions of the First Army attacked at 0630 from Lievin in south to La Bassee Canal in north. The weather was wet and miserable. In the south, 47 Division made slow progress. 2 Division's attack in the north, in which Robert Graves took part, failed as the gas blew back. In centre the German line was penetrated up to 3,000 yards in depth (2 miles) in places on an 8,000 yard (5 mile) front but XI Corps was not ready when needed. When the reserves finally arrived the Germans had regrouped and inflicted huge casualties. The enemy had established defence in depth, with mutually supporting strong points, wire, machine guns, units held back in support to counterattack, and artillery pre-registered on positions: "der Bechenfeld von Loos", Field of Corpses.
The outcome had been decided in the first 24 hours but battle dragged on till 18th October and the British suffered 62,000 casualties.
Composed of 44 (Highland) Brigade; 45 (Mixed) Brigade; 46 (Lowland) Brigade, the 15th, a K2 Division, had been in the line since the end of July 1915.
44 Brigade (Highland) |
|
---|---|
9 Black Watch |
10 Gordons |
8 Seaforths |
7 Camerons |
45 Brigade (Mixed) |
|
13 Royal Scots |
6 Camerons |
7 Royal Scots Fusiliers |
11 Argyll & Sutherlands |
46 Brigade (Lowland) |
|
7 KOSB |
10 Cameronians |
8 KOSB |
12 HLI |
Pioneers |
9 Gordons |
"Its objectives were Loos Village, Hill 70, Puits 14 bis, finally Cite St Auguste and the ridge north of Loisens sur Lens, The ground was open and undulating with the Double Grassier (slag), Tower Bridge (a pithead), and Puits 14 bis (an auxiliary mineshaft) as features. In cold and drizzly weather, 44 and 46 Brigades attacked at 0630 on 25th September but the gas, released at 0550, blew back on the left and, in rallying the KOSB, Piper Laidlaw won the VC. Good progress was made on the right and in the centre and ensured that Loos village was taken. The troops swept on and over Hill 70 but lost direction as officers were lost. Dynamitiere, which they entered, became German killing zone (KZ). The Scots were forced to withdraw to crest of Hill 70. Both flanks were in the air since contact with 47 Division on right was cut off by Double Grassier and 1st Division on left had made little progress. At 1200, 45 Brigade, the Divisional Reserve, were ordered into Loos with the 6th Camerons designated to protect the left flank at Puits 14 bis.
Time was ripe for exploitation but XI Corps was not to hand and the Germans counter-attacked. Finally, at 1800, 62 Brigade (21st Division) arrived exhausted, hungry, and completely disorientated.
When action was resumed on 26 September the attack by 21st and 24th Divisions on Bois Hugo and Hulluch led to chaos and rout down Philosophe Road. Lt Col A Douglas Hamilton of 6th Camerons was awarded a posthumous VC. 15 Division hung on around the lower slopes of Hill 60 till 1600 when 6 Cavalry Brigade arrived dismounted. The Division was then withdrawn to Mazingarbe at midnight after having suffered 6,600 casualties from 19,212.
The 9th, consisting of 26 (Highland) Brigade, 27 (Mixed) Brigade and 28 (Lowland) Brigade, was the senior of Kitchener's "New Army" Divisions in K1 and had arrived first in France in May 1915.
The Division's objectives on the 25th September were Hulloch Road, Fosse 8 (pithead), Dump (20' high bing), swinging east to St Elie and Haisnes, thence to Douvrin with the prospect of a breakthrough by XI Corps. The ground, which included the built-up area of Corons de Pekin, was heavily defended with wire, blockhouses and machinegun nests. 26 Brigade bombed its way into Hulloch Road after 0630 to regroup at Trois Cabarets and Corons de Pekin at 0730 but took heavy casualties from machineguns at Mad Point. On the left, 28 Brigade met with disaster; unable to
get through the wire, they tried again and failed. Thereafter they were out of action. 26 Brigade, however, reached the Pekin trench at 0800 and waited for reinforcements. The Germans regrouped. 27 Brigade, the Divisional Reserve, was pushed forward at 1000 and reached the Pekin Trench only to meet the German counter attack and worsening weather. By nightfall 9 Div held Fosse Alley, Corons de Pekin, and Hulloch Road but during the night the Germans infiltrated Quarry, captured the Brigade Commander and forced 27 Brigade to retire to the British lines to regroup.
On 26th September 26 Brigade was relieved by 73 Brigade (24th Division) whose complete inexperience posed the likelihood that Hulloch Road might be lost. The General Officer Commanding (Major-General George Thesiger) was killed at the front on reconnaissance and in 26 Brigade's counter attack Corporal Pollock, 5 Camerons, won the VC. 27 Brigade held Fosse Alley, Corons de Pekin and Hulloch Road but was forced back on Dump Trench in the Battle of the Slag Heaps. At 1500 26 Brigade counter attacked for the third time. Now only 600 strong they saved Hulloch Road but with the loss of Fergus Bowes-Lyon. The Brigade was relieved finally at 2130 by 85 Brigade, a new formation, and 9th Division withdrew to Bethune. They had lost 190 officers and 5868 men killed or wounded.
Artillery - poor quality and insufficient stocks of ammunition; lack of professionalism with little emphasis on counter battery work (Infantry win battles - artillery seen as an auxiliary arm; enemy guns could not be properly observed or reached; the creeping barrage would not be developed till 1916; predicted shooting from maps almost unheard of; artillery surveillance systems rudimentary; far too few high explosive (HE) shells; Forward Observation Officers (FOO) constrained by flat terrain could not register fire till first objectives were secured. Gas - unpredictable
Command, Control, Communication - difficult due to reliance on line and runners (doves!); no radios; once troops were committed to battle little commanders could do; difficulty of bringing forward reinforcements under fire and of bringing wounded back. All contributed to what the historian Clausewitz described as the "Fog of war".
Lack of Training - Inexperience of staff officers in handling large formations (especially 21 and 24 Divisions); British operation at company level rather than platoon level; poor weapon handling - rifles and machineguns jamming; poor grenades; inadequate chemical protection.
Quality of Germans - In defence and counter attack - defence in depth with mutually supporting systems; units held back for counter attack.
Generals in Chateaux - The Myth of senior officers far behind the Lines; here, however, Major-General George Thesiger commanding 9 Division and the Brigadier General of 27 Brigade were both killed in action.
Outcome - Sir John French, blamed for delay in releasing General Reserve, was removed; Haig took over
Iain D. McIntosh, 2022